Precursors of the Egyptian Revolution by Ali, Khalid
How and when did the forces of the Egyptian
revolution take shape? Answering this question
requires an understanding of the forerunners of
the Egyptian revolution, which have become
increasingly visible over the last decade. The
past decade has witnessed one of the most
vibrant periods of Egyptian protest against
Mubarak’s regime. Egyptians rebelled for diverse
reasons: on international matters, Arab causes,
as well as domestic issues relating to civil,
political, economic and social rights.
But what do these precursors tell us? Were they
indicative of the salience of major political
organisations or popular movements grounded in
historical theories? Or were they simply
spontaneous bursts without organisation and
political consciousness whose actions and
successes were simply a lucky happenstance? Or,
are we in fact talking about a new phenomenon
based on unconventional ways of engaging?
This article attempts to trace the harbingers of
revolution through a number of ‘signposts’, in
the hope of unfolding some dimensions of this
highly dynamic and complex reality.
1 First signpost: establishment of the ‘Popular
Committee to Support the Palestinian Intifada’
The second Palestinian Intifada (uprising) that
began in 2000 was accompanied by reprehensible
Israeli attacks on Palestinians, which stoked
Egyptians’ solidarity with the Palestinians. They
took to the streets in large demonstrations to
decry Israeli atrocities and to protest against the
stance taken by Mubarak. Various political forces
including human rights organisations and
political parties founded the ‘Popular Committee
to Support the Palestinian Intifada’, and
subcommittees were formed in Egyptian
universities and numerous governorates, cities
and local neighbourhoods. The committees
issued calls for demonstrations and collected
food, medicine and clothes to be dispatched to
the Palestinian people in solidarity convoys.
The Popular Committee succeeded in mobilising
political and social forces in support of the
Palestinian cause, recruiting school and university
students to its activities, thus functioning as a
political incubator, by teaching young people
political and organisational skills and most
importantly, creating an organisational umbrella
to unite all political forces in the public arena.
This constituted a challenge to the Mubarak
regime and its repressive apparatus and laws.
The Popular Committee publicly set up offices in
all governorates without obtaining permission or
consent from the authorities. All of its activities
were public, whether organisational meetings,
the collection of donations, the organisation of
aid convoys, planning for demonstrations, and
the preparation of political statements.
2 Second signpost: American invasion of Iraq
The year 2003 marked the US/European attack
on Iraq and the beginning of the occupation.
Large-scale demonstrations were organised of a
16
Precursors of the Egyptian Revolution
Khalid Ali 
Abstract This article argues that there had been sustained protests for at least a decade before the
January 25th uprisings, which functioned as the political incubators that nurtured the forces of the
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kind and scale unseen in Egypt since the uprising
over price increases in 1977. Hundreds of
protestors gathered in Tahrir Square and
occupied it; security forces proved unable to
deter them, and protestors spent the night in the
square on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. During
the demonstrations, police met protestors with
violence and launched an arrest campaign
targeting Nasserists and communists, as well as
some Islamist leaders who had refused to
demonstrate in the Cairo Stadium along with the
Muslim Brotherhood and the National
Democratic Party (NDP).
Large numbers of Egyptians turned out for this
action not only because of the importance of the
Arab issues but also because some Egyptians
hold a particular fondness for Iraq, where for
many years Egyptians of middle and low income
could work without entry visas or local sponsors.
Also, many Egyptian families feared that family
members working in Iraq would be killed or
injured, and that the war would entail a loss of
their financial and economic stability. Upon
returning to Egypt, assetless, they were unable to
find work. There was thus much anger at the US
occupation of the country and Mubarak and his
regime, for supporting the war.
3 Third signpost: domestic Egyptian issues
A year later, protests against the US invasion of
Iraq had largely subsided, but in the summer of
2004, Egyptian political forces announced the
formation of two political committees
established to confront Mubarak and his regime:
the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) and
the Popular Campaign for Change (‘Freedom
Now’). Kifaya (Enough) was the more well known
of the two and involved a number of political
forces, including Islamists, leftists, liberals, and
Nasserists. Freedom Now was largely comprised
of leftist factions that refused to join Kifaya.
Despite this organisational difference, the
groups complemented one another at certain
historical junctures. While Kifaya called for
demonstrations in Tahrir Square and in front of
the Journalists Syndicate, Freedom Now
organised demonstrations in popular
neighbourhoods such as Matariya, Shubra and al-
Zaytun. The focus of all political forces in all
demonstrations and press statements was the
rejection of an extended term of office for
Mubarak and the transfer of power to his son
Gamal.
This period witnessed fierce confrontations
between political forces and the police. One of
the most significant incidents involved the
sexual harassment of female protestors, who
were also insulted and beaten in front of the
Journalists Syndicate, the Lawyers Syndicate,
Sa’d Zaghlul’s mausoleum, and in Tahrir Square.
Ultimately, the Mubarak regime was able to
amend the constitution and Mubarak was elected
to another term in office, but the plan to pass the
presidency to Gamal Mubarak rested on shakier
ground.
These political movements also managed to
attract young people and students to politics and
broke forever the taboo surrounding not
contesting Mubarak and his family personally.
Mubarak himself was widely criticised in the
protests of 2000 and 2003, but his family
emerged unscathed, in contrast to the protests of
2004–05, which were largely directed against the
succession plan, i.e. against Mubarak’s family.
4 Fourth signpost: the judges’ battle
After the regime successfully rigged
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005,
the Egyptian political movement felt defeated
and grew silent. In such a political environment,
however, a new battle came to the fore – between
the government and the judges. In 2005, the
Mubarak regime had forced judges into a corner;
they had agreed to supervise the elections with
no guarantees of transparency and
accountability. The president of the committee
overseeing presidential elections disqualified
1,700 judges from election supervision, and a bill
drawn in 1991 to safeguard their independence
was ignored (Al-Shahat 20061). Judges were thus
asked not only to sign off on election rigging, but
to remain silent about attacks on voters,
harassment by thugs, and voter suppression.
Some judges themselves were physically
attacked, which was virtually unprecedented in
Egyptian judicial history.2 A total of 165 assaults
on judges were documented during the
parliamentary elections, yet only ten of them
were investigated, according to figures from the
Judges Club. In the wake of this, groups of judges
led by the Egyptian Judges Club (a civic
association established with the view of
representing judges’ interests) took action to
demand full judicial independence from the
executive authority.
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In a meeting of the Judges Club general assembly
on 13 May 2005, the president of the club, Judge
Zakariya ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, told the assembled judges,
‘Do not forsake the people of Egypt and their
hopes for democracy and reform’. For a variety of
reasons, the battle for judicial independence
became central to the battle for democracy.
First, judges enjoy substantial credibility among
the Egyptian public. The demand for reform and
accusations of election rigging came this time
from people who were ostensibly a part of the
basic power structure of any bourgeois state.
Suddenly, meetings were taking place in which
thousands of people who possessed judicial
immunity and represented, at least formally, part
of the constitutional system were exposing that
very system. In short, a wing from within the
regime with substantial credibility began to
embarrass Mubarak and his clique.
Second, the demands of this wing coincided with
the demands of pro-democracy movements. This
was an extremely significant moment,
suggesting that the Mubarak regime had begun
fraying from the inside as core groups that had
long been viewed as part of the system and the
public authorities – like the judiciary – began
turning against the regime. Tarek Al Bishri,
famous writer and judge, noted that the Judges
Club was not an ordinary professional
association, but rather the institutional
embodiment of the judiciary itself; professional
independence for judges thus meant sovereignty
of the law and making Mubarak himself subject
to the rule of law – and for this, they incurred
Mubarak’s vengeance. While at the start of this
decade the street movement had the upper hand,
by 2006 all eyes had turned to the judges and
what some termed the judges uprising or
revolution. This moment came to an end with
the promulgation of the deformed judges’ law.
5 Fifth signpost: trade union elections and the
Mahalla strike of 2006
Egyptian workers were hoping for genuine
change in the structure and membership of the
government co-opted trade unions, which held
elections from September to November 2006 for
the union session of 2006–11 (Khalid 2007a). Yet
instead, some 30,000 candidates were
disqualified from the elections without legal
basis – court orders obtained by workers
contesting this move were not implemented –
and pro-government forces won all the seats in
elections. Within the trade unions, changes in
personnel were purely cosmetic.
The working class had faced enormous social
oppression, while the official trade unions
operated in the interest of government policies at
the expense of workers’ rights. At no point did the
official unions ever seriously defend these rights.
On the contrary, they blessed the sale of the
public sector and the elimination of labour on the
pretext of restructuring public enterprises from
the 1990s onwards. Unions lodged no real
objections to the state’s control over pension
funds, which reached LE200 billion by 2006, and
they ignored the beginning of the application of
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) and its impact on the socioeconomic
conditions of workers. Education, health,
pharmaceuticals, water, transportation, electricity,
telephony and housing were all transformed from
rights into commodities, available to anyone who
could pay the cost. The official trade unions also
ignored the effects of the 2003 floating of the
Egyptian pound, which reduced the pound’s
purchasing power by some 40 per cent. The
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) and the
official syndicates did not oppose these policies
and refrained from pressuring the government to
adopt any protectionist programmes to support
labour economically and socially in the face of
these policies.
Workers thus had no choice but to protest,
demonstrate, and strike, seeking wage increases,
incentive pay and bonuses. For workers, the
primary issue was the large gap between wages
and prices, the latter of which rose steadily year
after year following currency liberalisation and
which led to a lowering of their real income by
40 per cent. This background helps explain the
increase in labour protests from 2003 to 2004: in
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Table 1 Documented labour protests (1999–2006)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of protests 164 135 138 96 86 266 202 222
2003, there were 86 such protests, but by 2004,
the number had risen to 266. In 2005, 202 labour
protests were documented, followed by 222
protests in 2006. Table 1 illustrates the
increasing number of protests.
It was thus no surprise that Anwar al-Hawari,
the editor-in-chief of Al-Wafd, commenting on
the labour elections, noted that this was ‘the year
of the worker’. Public intellectual Tareq Al Bishri
criticised the performance of some political
forces that did not support workers in their
elections and suggested paying closer attention
to labour, as a new social indicator that required
support. Prior to the elections, the last article
that mentioned workers as a sector was
published on Labour Day. Written by Ibrahim
‘Issa, the editor-in-chief of Al-Dostor, it was titled
‘Egyptian Workers: Unite and Unify’. In the
article ‘Issa wondered where workers were and
why they remained silent about their miserable
social and economic conditions. The article took
a blinkered view of labour resistance, and neither
‘Issa nor anyone else took note that the labour
movement had been on the rise for some years.
The public did not see this, as workers had long
fallen out of the public consciousness, ignored by
the political forces and the press and media
(Khalid 2007a).
On 6 December 2006, 25,000 workers at Misr
Spinning and Weaving in Mahalla al-Kubra went
on strike to protest the failure to disburse the
profit shares that workers had been promised
during the union elections. Faced with such a
large number of strikers, the government yielded
to the workers’ demands, after initially declaring
them illegitimate. The regime’s response to
labour reflected its panic. It did not give in to
their demands voluntarily, but rather was
compelled to do so because it did not want
another battle on its hands (in particular since
several other groups had joined the ranks of
dissent including doctors, engineers, teachers
and renowned intellectuals and public figures).
The modesty and reasonableness of labour
demands won them legitimacy. There are some
104,000 workers in the public textile sector. On
average, they demanded LE70–100 in annual
profit-sharing dividends – a relatively meagre
sum of LE13 million. Meanwhile, the government
spent LE500 million renovating ministers’ offices
(al-Naggar 2007) even as it let the strike in some
factories continue through the ninth day and left
other workers on hunger strike. Ultimately, an
agreement was reached for a food-stipend
increase costing about LE13 million a year (al-
Hariri 2007), prompting the workers to end the
strike with the feeling that justice had been done.
For the first time in years, labour and the regime
had reached a compromise. By the might of pure
force, the regime could repress the labour action
and use violence, the regime could not be sure how
they would react to the use of violence, particularly
since labour actions involved large numbers and
took place in heavily populated areas.
6 Sixth signpost: rising labour anger, the clash
of April 2008
6.1 2007 and rising labour anger
The year 2007 saw 692 labour protests all
involving the civil and industrial sectors of the
country. Not one day passed in Egypt without at
least one labour protest happening (Khalid
2007b). It is important to note that if the textile
sector was the engine leading labour protests in
early 2006, civil servants and government workers
became the fuel of the labour movement in 2007,
injecting it with force and vitality. These
included: teachers, educational administrators
and university professors in the education sector;
doctors, nurses, paramedics and health insurance
employees in the health sector; railroad and
metro-workers in the transportation sector and
property-tax collectors in the financial sector. It is
important to note that also included were civil
servants with al-Azhar, supply and the waqf
administration; data collectors at the Central
Accounting Agency; workers with the revenue
department in Alexandria; revenue collectors and
cashiers in Asyut; civil servants with the Ministry
of Manpower; workers with the Forensic Medicine
Department and prosecutors’ offices and workers
and navigators with the Suez Canal Authority.
Despite the diversity of government workers
involved, the common nature of their suffering –
largely, the gap between wages and prices – was
clear. In turn, this diversity highlighted the need
for unity and organisation to enable them to
achieve their rights in a strategic way, which was
encapsulated later in the demand for a minimum
wage commensurate with prices to be periodically
adjusted to secure a dignified life.
On 3 December 2007, Egypt saw the first labour
sit-in in the streets of Cairo. Dubbed the first
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‘civil servant revolution’, the action was
organised by property-tax collectors seeking
affiliation with the Ministry of Finance instead of
municipalities – a sore spot since 1974. While
technically they were subordinate to the Finance
Ministry, administratively and financially they
were municipal employees, which gave them less
financial rights than their peers in the general or
sales tax administration. Property-tax collectors
staged a sit-in in Husayn Higazi Street in front
of the Cabinet building, demanding affiliation
with the Finance Ministry. The sit-in lasted for
11 days and was only called off after their
demands were met.
On the first anniversary of the sit-in, in
December 2008 at the Journalists Syndicate,
property-tax collectors announced they were
forming the first independent trade union in
Egypt outside the official union organisation.
They filed the registration papers with the
Ministry of Manpower in April 2009.
6.2 The April 2008 clash
Egypt entered 2008 with numerous labour
victories. Some thought that these strikes were
simply spontaneous, unorganised actions, which
proved to be an erroneous analysis (Khalid
2007b). The fact that the labour movement was
not controlled by a party did not mean it was not
organised. The movement used tools and
mechanisms characterised by a high degree of
organisation and diversity emanating from the
experience of the Egyptian labour movement
over its long history. These mechanisms ranged
from deception to concession, and involved a
distribution of roles and various forms of strikes
and solidarity. Most importantly, the movement
brought a new kind of experiment to the
Egyptian scene, missing from labour history
since the 1994 strike in Kafr al-Dawwar.
The success of the labour strikes had significant
social repercussions, and the strike became the
readiest weapon used by social and demand-
based movements.3
This labour ferment and its successes invigorated
Egyptian society, giving it self-confidence and
fortitude. The strike was not simply a means of
expression and a declaration of demands but was,
from the first moment, a means of pressure
whereby the end of the strike was strongly linked
to the realisation of demands. It broke all the
legislative, political and security constraints
impeding the Egyptian social mobilisation.
All of this fostered an attempt to cleave to the
labour movement, support it, advance it or
advance other demands on its shoulders. Thus,
no sooner had workers in Mahalla al-Kubra
announced their intention to strike on 6 April
2008 if the government did not meet their
demands (the dismissal of the CEO of the
company, the revocation of arbitrary decisions
and an increase in some financial benefits),
political forces declared their support for
Mahalla workers. Kifaya sent out an appeal
asking its activists to demonstrate in every
governorate in support of the workers, and a
youth group propagated a campaign on blogs and
Facebook asking Egyptians to stay at home on
that day in solidarity with the textile workers.
These appeals were heard throughout the
country, prompting the Interior Ministry to issue
a statement on 5 April 2008 demanding that all
citizens go to work and reject the call to stay at
home, demonstrate in the street or stage
workplace strikes. The Interior Ministry drafted
a security plan to seize control of the Mahalla
factory to end the strike action, and from the
early hours of 6 April, the factory was turned into
a military barracks. Security forces were
deployed in all factory floors and worker buses.
Although security did indeed manage to thwart
the strike, it was surprised by a forceful response
to the stay-at-home campaign in Cairo and Giza
that exceeded all expectations. Demonstrations
were also held in eight governorates: Cairo, Giza,
Kafr al-Shaykh, Daqahliya, Alexandria, Buhayra,
Gharbiya and Qalyubiya but were contained,
with the exception of those in Mahalla. In
Mahalla, virtually the entire town took to the
streets. Residents clashed with police forces,
supported by reinforcements from nearby
governorates. It was the first time that posters
bearing Mubarak’s name and image were torn
down, ripped up, torched and stomped upon
because of domestic demands rather than in
connection with Palestine or Iraq. The police fired
live ammunition on demonstrators, killing three
young men and injuring dozens. They incarcerated
nearly 1,000 residents. The city was put under
siege and a three-day curfew was declared.
Despite the difficulty of 2008 for workers, it did
see a notable victory when property-tax collectors
announced their intention to form an independent
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union. This move, which led the labour movement
to reclaim its right to organise, was a long-sought
victory by the Egyptian working class. In addition,
the youth groups, that had called for solidarity
with the workers, announced the formation of a
youth organisation called ‘April 6th’, in
recognition and commemoration of that day.
Thus, the year ended with two new organisations:
a youth group and a labour group, who joined
other forces opposed to Mubarak and his regime.
7 Seventh signpost: people protests
7.1 Protests of thirst
On 3 July 2007, some 3,000 citizens from Burg al-
Burullus in the governorate of Kafr al-Shaykh in
the northern Delta came out to protest against a
more than 20-day interruption of potable water
service; the water had been diverted to the Baltim
resort to meet the 24-hour needs of holidaymakers!
After one extended demonstration, locals cut off
the international coastal road, located on the
Mediterranean coast, causing a 14-hour traffic
jam that stretched over some 80 km, and
chanted slogans against the governor General
Salah Salama, the former head of State Security
Investigations – demanding his removal and
blaming him for the water crisis. By 29 July 2007,
the water crisis had spread to several
governorates, including Cairo, Giza, Daqahliya,
Gharbiya, Minya, Kafr al-Shaykh, Qalyubiya,
Fayum and Manufiya, to the indignation of
citizens who had no access to water in the
simmering heat of Egyptian summers. Others in
Marg (a district of northern Cairo) blocked the
road to a cavalcade that included three
ministers, among them the minister of housing.
Residents of Faysal and the Pyramids area
threatened to block the Ring Road, while in
Daqahliya, the thirsty refused to break up their
sit-in and demanded that President Mubarak
himself visit them.
Some protestors even gathered in front of the
Journalists Syndicate to demand that those
responsible be held to account and accused the
government of neglecting the demands and vital
needs of the citizenry.4 In several cities and
regions that saw interruptions to the water
supply, black markets in water emerged and
citizens scuffled to obtain their needs.
The water demonstrations surprised the cultural
elite, the intelligentsia, who had not imagined
that there were non-labour social sectors still
able to protest. Yet, here they were faced with
what looked like a broad civil disobedience
movement led by farmers, the socially excluded
and the destitute, from whom for years the
government had denied one of their most basic
rights to life: the right to clean drinking water.
The thirsty had exhausted all other means of
complaint and appeal.5
Commenting on the water demonstrations,
Dr ‘Asim al-Dassuqi, a professor of contemporary
history, noted, ‘The popular protest Egypt is now
witnessing a state of general desperation among
the Egyptian people because of a government
that has pursued a free-market policy and left
people to the vagaries of supply and demand…
[and] leaving the people to businessmen and
investors with no intervention to protect their
rights’.6
Dr ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Masiri (a renowned
intellectual) believed that ‘these events are a
rebellion against the ruler, [representing] a
disorganised revolution’. He said that the
government was resorting to a strategy of limited
fire fighting, although the conflagration
continued to blaze and increase whenever the
opportunity arose. Dr al-Masiri warned that
these protest movements might lead to
something like events in Europe in the Middle
Ages, when famine spread and the poor began to
kill the rich and plunder their wealth to stave off
hunger.7
Dr Mahmud Nur Farahat, a professor of the
philosophy of law, noted that the ‘rebellion of the
thirsty’ was evidence of the failure of the bloated
local administration in Egypt and the services it
oversees, to provide one of the most basic
amenities: water. He said that municipal
administrations all over Egypt were awash with
inefficiency and neglect and were not performing
their duties:
It’s outrageous to see millions of Egyptians
without clean drinking water in the 21st
century. If they can find it one hour, they still
need to search for it the rest of the day, and if
they have it for one day, they are denied it for
the rest of the week. How can you ask farmers
who cannot even slake their thirst to sow the
land and bring us crops sufficient to meet the
country’s needs?8
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7.2 Protests for subsidised flour and bread
Just as they were the first to protest the water
shortage in 2007, the residents of Burg
al-Burullus turned out again on 7 June 2008, to
protest against being denied subsidised flour and
bread. Again they blocked the coastal road to
protest their deprivation.
The governor of Kafr al-Shaykh, Ahmad Zaki
‘Abdidin,9 issued orders abolishing the quota of
subsidised flour given to grain storehouses and
transferring it directly to bakeries, in order to
prevent the flour being sold on the black market.
As usual, the governor simply gestured from his
office in the governorate building that starting
from such-and-such date, this decision would be
implemented, with no social debate to clarify the
reasons and justifications for the decision, or
even to discuss alternatives. The new governor
was apparently unaware that his predecessor,
Salah Salama, was removed from his post, thanks
to the water protests by residents of the same
village in 2007. ‘Abdidin did not discuss the
decision with local residents, even though nearly
90 per cent of them work in fishing and depend
on subsidised flour to make the bread they rely
on in the off-season. He also forgot that his
decision came at a time when local residents
were prohibited from fishing. The General
Agency for Fisheries requires fishers to suspend
their activities for more than two months,
ostensibly to protect fisheries.10
On 15 and 16 March 2008, large popular
demonstrations erupted in front of the
governorate building in Fayum. Hundreds of
rural women from nearby villages came to
protest the failure to distribute their monthly
flour allowance and the absence of bread, after
the owners of bakeries sold the flour on the black
market with the full knowledge of officials.11
The same crisis was seen in several other
governorates, giving rise to a bread shortage. Of
course, this led to fights among citizens and bakery
owners and some citizens were killed. The crisis
was only resolved when Mubarak ordered the army
to produce bread and set-up kiosks for distribution.
7.3 Butane crisis
In late February 2010, the butane crisis erupted.
Many Egyptians had difficulty in finding butane
canisters, and the price per canister reached
LE35 in some areas, although the real cost
should have been no more than LE3. The crisis
was not localised but spread throughout various
governorates, with the price of butane canisters
varying according to area. The lines shifted from
in front of the warehouses – which gave
preferential treatment to butane sellers over
citizens in order to increase profits – to the
homes of known butane sellers.
8 Eighth signpost: 2010, the year of
confrontation
8.1 The death of Khaled Said
Khaled Muhammad Said Subhi Qasim (27 January
1982–6 June 2010) was a 28-year-old Egyptian
from Alexandria who was tortured to death by
two police detectives after he uploaded a video
online documenting an officer and the two
detectives dividing hashish (a drug like
marijuana) and money seized in a drug bust.12
The two detectives beat him to death in front of
several eyewitnesses in the Sidi Gabir
neighbourhood. Said’s death sparked public
protests in Alexandria, Cairo and some
governorates. The Mubarak regime attempted to
contain the situation by spreading rumours about
Said and his death, claiming that he swallowed a
packet of marijuana, on which he choked – a lie
also included in the coroner’s report. Protests and
youth activities were organised in defence of Said,
and a Facebook page (‘We are all Khaled Said’)
was established in his name that attracted
hundreds of thousands of members interested in
resisting the oppression and injustice that had
brought the country to this state.
8.2 Reinvigoration of the labour movement
At the same time, the labour movement regained
its vitality and protest force. Labour protests saw
clashes between workers and police after workers
managed to embarrass the regime and move
most of their demonstrations and sit-ins to: the
Ministry of Manpower, the ETUF headquarters,
the Cabinet building, the Ministry of Education,
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Table 2 Documented labour protests (1999–2010)
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of protests 164 135 138 96 86 266 202 222 692 447 478 530
the Ministry of Local Development, the People’s
Assembly and Shura Council and the Public
Prosecutor’s Office. These sit-ins lasted nearly
ten months. Table 2 illustrates the frequency of
labour protests from 1999 to 2010.
9 Ninth signpost: Two Saints Church and the
Tunisian revolution
The final ‘signpost’ during Mubarak’s rule came
in January 2011. On Christmas Eve, the Two
Saints Church in Alexandria was bombed, killing
dozens and reopening deep sectarian wounds,
already a ticking bomb liable to explode at the
slightest provocation. As usual, official
statements alluded to ‘hidden hands’ from
abroad. All media were banned from the site,
and security campaigns were set in motion that
struck terror into everyone and fostered silence
in fear of police power. It was at this time that
Sayyid Bilal was tortured to death by State
Security personnel.
Political forces staged demonstrations in Shubra
al-Khayma demanding the truth, and several
young people were arrested and charged with
inciting sectarian strife. It became clear to all
that this was a regime that not only lacked
competence, but was also irrational enough to
arrest young people on charges of fomenting
strife after they demonstrated in rejection of
sectarianism and all discrimination against Copts
(native Egyptian Christians).
Indeed, many felt there was a relationship
between the succession plan and the church
bombing. The question was whether the event
would be used to increase the scope of repression
and quash liberties, purportedly to quell civil
strife, until the succession plan was implemented.
It was a question looking for an answer, and for
the next two weeks, all social forces looked for a
lifeline to save the country from what was
coming. The first hints of salvation came from
Tunisia when Zine El Abidine fled the country, a
victory which revived Egyptians’ hope. Youth
forces seized on this moment by turning a call for
demonstrations on 25 January  – Police Day – to
protest against the police into the date of the
Egyptian revolution. Meanwhile, the well-
established party forces assumed their usual
rejectionist stance. The Egyptian street
responded to the appeal, and thousands took to
the streets on 25 January, followed by millions on
28 January, ultimately bringing down Mubarak
and his clique.
10 Conclusion
Looking more closely at these important turning
points helps to clarify the links between Egyptian
protests prior to the January 25th revolution.
Were it not for these protests, the revolution
would not have succeeded. The protests
functioned as a political incubator that nurtured
the forces of the revolution, shaping their
political and organisational consciousness and
from which several conclusions can be drawn.
First, most, if not all, political forces described
and analysed Egyptian movements and protests
in conventional terms, consistently focusing on
the major movements and on the explicitly
political, ignoring smaller protests and especially
those staged by marginalised groups in defence
of their basic demands. Before the Mahalla
strike in December 2006, neither political forces
nor the social and cultural elite paid attention to
working-class movements, which began to gain
steam in 2004 and reached their peak in the trade
union elections from August to November 2006.
For them, the Mahalla action of 6 December
2006 came as a shock.
Similarly, protests by the poor over housing, forced
displacement, irrigation or potable water, butane
and bread and flour did not garner the attention
they deserved. Instead, they were the focus of
scant media coverage wrapped in political
sloganeering by some parties, which faded as soon
as the government offered some partial solution
or sedative. Meanwhile, everyone ignored basic
questions: What are these protests? Why and how
did they emerge? This same neglect was shown
towards the torture of the marginalised and the
poor in police stations, whether in cities or
hamlets in the Delta and Upper Egypt.
It is the author’s belief that the description,
examination and analysis of these protests would
have revealed a rising social resistance, and, of
course, they were highly indicative of the
conflicting relationship between these groups
and the ruling authority.
Second, Egyptian protests of recent years
revealed a diverse array of tools of protest and
resistance, with many employing non-traditional
methods. Protests against the siege on Gaza
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were not limited to demonstrations; through the
Popular Committee, Egyptians collected food,
medicine and clothes and sent them to the
Egyptian–Palestinian border in people-organised
convoys. The movement of these convoys from
the provinces to Arish and Rafah constituted a
challenge not only to the Israeli siege, but also to
the Mubarak regime and its security policies.
Workers were also creative in the form and
places of their protests. Workplace labour
protests are a well-known tactic, but Egyptian
workers took their protests and sit-ins to the
spaces symbolic of decision-makers’ powers: to
ministries, government agencies, the People’s
Assembly (parliament) and Shura Council, the
Cabinet building and the pro-NDP ETUF –
where they camped out for more than 20 days.
Workers organised mock funerals and removed
their clothes, writing their demands on their
bodies. They were sometimes accompanied by
their wives and children and were often led by
women. They carried empty pots to illustrate
their poverty and want, banged drums and used
whistles to raise the alarm.
Egyptian youth made creative use of mobile
phones, blogs, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and
other social communication tools (see Ezbawy,
this IDS Bulletin). The stay-at-home campaign of
6 April 2008, was perhaps the public declaration
that armies of bloggers and young people had
joined the battle against the regime. These tools
were long belittled as a virtual struggle in a
virtual world with no connection to reality, while
the success of the April 6th uprising was seen as
a coincidence, difficult to repeat. Everyone
discovered how wrong they had been on the
morning of 25 January.
Third, it was not only political forces that failed
to accurately assess and analyse Egyptians’
protests, but also the regime and its political and
security arms. The same outdated framework for
engaging with citizen agency guided the thinking
and response of political forces and age-old parties.
Fourth, the Egyptian protests that were crowned
by the ‘revolution of January 25th’ swept away
numerous stock theories about how the masses
protest or make a revolution, particularly
institutional and organisational theories that
posit the need for a large, strong organisational
structure for any revolution to occur. In contrast,
events showed that the important point is action
taken by the people (the interest group) on a
demand regardless of anyone else’s assessment
or view of the demand. Demands that seem
simple to politicians, analysts or even regular
citizens may, to those who make them, be
demands worth dying for. The demands of the
property-tax collectors were merely
administrative demands that would win them
some financial benefit by affiliating them to the
Finance Ministry instead of municipal
administrations. Yet their success in securing
those basic rights prompted them to examine
the reasons, and they arrived at the conclusion
that it was because they acted collectively and
sought out a mechanism that would maintain
this collectivism. This gave birth to their
establishment of the first independent trade
union for Egyptian workers since the 1960s.
Hence, the above challenges us to reassess
Egyptian activism in the past decade and to
evaluate and analyse the revolution that swept
away outdated theories and exposed new, simple
tools of struggle that do not necessarily require
an overarching, strong organisation or inspiring
leader, as much as they need the faith of the
interest group in their demands and action to
achieve them, no matter how simple. I believe
the first step in this reassessment must be to
abandon all condescending attitudes towards
basic human demands, whatever the social status
of the claimants.
Egyptians’ protests and their resistance to
injustice and oppression that led to the
revolution were not grounded in major political
organisations or popular movements based on
grand historical theories. Nor were they
spontaneous gusts that took random actions that
just happened to succeed; rather, they indicate
an awareness, an organisation, a use of
unconventional approaches that does not fit
within narrow frameworks of interpreting reality.
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Notes
1 A paper published on the website of the
Center for Socialist Studies.
2 Only once or twice had judges been personally
assaulted and even then as individuals, such
as the assault on al-Sanhuri in the State
Council in 1954.
3 Al-Wafd, 28 February 2007: 2.
4 Nahdat Misr, 30 July 2007.
5 Al-Masry al-Youm, 22 July 2007.
6 Al-Masry al-Youm, 22 July 2007.
7 Al-Masry al-Youm, 22 July 2007.
8 Al-Masry al-Youm, 22 July 2007.
9 A former general with State Security
Investigations.
10 Burullus leader Ra’uf al-‘Ubaydi said, in a
panel organised by the Liberties Committee
at the Journalists Syndicate, entitled ‘What is
Happening in Burullus?’ on 17 June, ‘A 10-kilo
sack of flour for LE7 is the only guaranteed
food. Blocking the road because of the water
problem caused grave losses. They wouldn’t
have let us do that again. But even if they
block all legitimate channels, we’ll dig tunnels
underground. We have legitimate, legal
motivations’.
11 The website ‘Al-Kushuf ’ reported on 17 March
2008, that Magda Ahmad, from Ma’sara Sawi,
said, ‘Supply inspectors attacked and beat us
and told us, “Go and wet your ration cards and
drink the water you can squeeze out of them.”
Then they threw them in our faces’.
Muhammad ‘Ali Mahmud from the district of
Tamiya said that the governor of Fayum
‘turned over the necks of citizens’ to the
owners of bakeries, while he was busy with
parties and banquets with guests and senior
officials. Suhayr Ibrahim said, ‘We want to eat.
We only have ten rounds of bread a day and we
stand for hours at the bakery to get them.
Meanwhile, local flour is being sold right in
front of us with the knowledge of the supply
directorate. The price has reached LE400.’
‘Abdullah Ahmad complained about the poor
quality of the bread and the shortage at the
bakeries saying, ‘Our children went to school
without eating. A kilo of pasta costs LE5 and
the governor is living in another world’.
12 The video uploaded by Khaled Said can be seen
at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJDbTeynrJ0
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